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ABSTRACT
This paper provides an economic analysis of underground gun markets drawing on interviews with
gang members, gun dealers, professional thieves, prostitutes, police, public school security guards
and teens in the city of Chicago, complemented by results from government surveys of recent
arrestees  in  22  cities  plus  administrative  data  for  suicides,  homicides,  robberies,  arrests  and
confiscated crime guns. We find evidence of considerable frictions in the underground market for
guns in Chicago. We argue that these frictions are due primarily to the fact that the underground gun
market is both illegal and “thin”  ￿ the number of buyers, sellers and total transactions is small and
relevant information is scarce. Gangs can help overcome these market frictions, but the gang’s
economic interests cause gang leaders to limit supply primarily to gang members, and even then
transactions are usually loans or rentals with strings attached.
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This paper provides an economic analysis of underground gun markets 
drawing on interviews with gang members, gun dealers, professional thieves, 
prostitutes, police, public school security guards and teens in the city of Chicago, 
complemented by results from government surveys of recent arrestees in 22 
cities plus administrative data for suicides, homicides, robberies, arrests and 
confiscated crime guns.  The topic is of interest in part because of the substantial 
social costs of gun violence, on the order of $100 billion per year (Cook and 
Ludwig, 2000).  Systematic data on prices and quantities are generally lacking for 
underground markets, and ours is no exception.  But we are able to provide a 
qualitative picture of how Chicago’s underground gun market operates.
1   
 
  Underground gun markets have developed in America in response to 
regulations that seek to prohibit ownership and possession by that sub-set of the 
population deemed to be at unacceptably high risk of misusing guns – primarily 
youth and adults with serious prior criminal records
2 – while preserving easy 
access for everyone else.  A few jurisdictions, including Chicago, go further and 
essentially prohibit the private possession of handguns, the type of gun most 
commonly used in crime and violence. 
 
  Economists and other skeptics like to point out that government 
prohibitions on transactions are difficult to enforce; the ingenuity of the 
marketplace, motivated by profit, will overcome whatever legal obstacles are put 
in place.  If true for handguns in Chicago, then we would expect to find that 
youths and criminals are able to acquire them with little trouble (low transaction 
costs) at prices not that much higher from those in the legal market.  As NYU law 
professor James Jacobs observes in this regard, “Some criminals claim that it is 
as easy to buy a gun on the streets as it is to buy fast food.  One Chicago gang 
member stated, ‘It’s like going through the drive-through window.  Give me some 
fries, a Coke, and a 9-millimeter” (2002, p. 150).
3 
 
Yet we find evidence of considerable frictions in the underground market 
for guns in Chicago and other cities as well, including substantial transaction 
costs and markups over prevailing prices in the legal market.  We argue that the 
key features of the market that produce these frictions are illegality and 
“thinness,” that is, small numbers of buyers, sellers and total transactions. 
 
                                                 
1 Most of what is known about the underground gun market comes from interviews with 
incarcerated prisoners or inner-city youth (for example Wright and Rossi, 1994, Webster et al., 
2002, Sheley and Wright, 1993, Callahan and Rivara, 1992).  However such interviews can at 
best shed light on how a subset of the retail market operates, and are not informative about other 
aspects of market structure or conduct. 
2 These groups do account for much of all crime (Cook and Laub, 1998, Cook, Ludwig and Braga 
2005).  
3 Jacobs’ quote taken from Don Terry, “How Criminals Get Their Guns:  In Short, All Too Easily,” 
The New York Times, March 11, 1992, p. A1.   2 
Illegality introduces a variety of information problems into the market and 
complicates the search for trading opportunities for both buyers and sellers.  The 
search problem is exacerbated in the underground gun market by the need for 
information about the trustworthiness of one’s trading partner.  There are legal 
risks resulting from the possibility that the buyer or seller is an undercover police 
officer, financial risks given that contracts cannot be enforced by the usual legal 
institutions, and risks of serious injury given the nature of the good itself. 
 
Illegality and thinness both appear necessary to generate the substantial 
frictions that we document for the underground gun market.  Thinness matters 
because as suggested by Diamond (1982), in a stochastic search model there 
will be trading externalities where trade makes further trade more profitable, 
which also implies that thinness begets further thinness.  In part because guns 
are durable goods, repeat business is rare, and so most every transaction is 
problematic.  In contrast, both legal, thin and illegal, thick markets create 
incentives for institutions to develop to reduce transactions costs.  In thin gun 
markets only people whose existing social networks contain both potential buyers 
and sellers find it worthwhile to become market makers in the underground gun 
market.  Transaction costs in this case persist in part because social networks 
are limited and not easily modified in response to changing market conditions. 
 
We find that street gangs can help overcome these market frictions, in part 
because gangs have good information about members.  But their economic 
objectives cause gang leaders to limit supply both in and out of the gang.  Some 
of the gang’s profits appear to be rent on the gang’s monopoly over gun violence.  
To prevent hostile takeovers, sales are limited outside of the gang and to lower-
level gang members as well.  While the ability and willingness to inflict violence is 
useful to the gang, in the short term gun violence depresses profits in a variety of 
ways, including from stepped-up police attention to the gang’s economic 
activities.  As a result many gun transactions within the gang are loans or rentals 
with strings attached rather than outright sales.  Despite these constraints many 
youths report joining gangs as a way to ensure access to guns, and when police 
catch gang members with guns they typically assume the guns were obtained 
through the gang.  The importance of gangs in the market lend credence to our 
findings of high transaction costs and prices in the underground market. 
 
As is often the case with illegal markets the objective of government policy 
is to reduce rather than enhance efficiency (Schelling, 1984), and our findings 
imply a number of ways that law enforcement might further increase transaction 
costs and prices at the retail level.  Of particular interest are possible 
enforcement activities in the areas of gun storage and ammunition, two important 
complements to guns that have not received much attention in the policy arena 
or research literature to date.  The Diamond model implies that there may be 
multiplier effects in the returns to enforcement activities in the underground gun 
market, given that market thinness begets further thinness.   
   3 
The next section provides some background on the context in which 
Chicago’s underground gun market operates.  The third section presents our 
main findings on market transactions and the role of illegality and thinness.  The 
role of gangs, gun storage and ammunition in the underground gun market are 
taken up in turn in sections four through six.  The final section discusses the 
study’s limitations and implications.  Finally, we note that this paper quotes 
verbatim from the field interviews conducted by one member of our team, Sudhir 
Venkatesh (SV), despite the fact that his informants are not always politically 
correct in their choice of words.  
 
II. Market Context 
   
The underground market in Chicago is shaped by the legal framework that 
regulates gun ownership and transactions.  The prevalence of guns in private 
hands is also relevant, since one source of guns to underground transactions is 
the existing stock.
4   
 
Nationwide, few criminals get their guns directly from licensed gun dealers 
(Wright and Rossi, 1994).  But the legal market for guns and legal ownership 
patterns affect supply in the underground market through theft – over 500,000 
guns are stolen each year (Cook and Ludwig, 1996) – and “secondary market” 
sales made by people who are not “engaged in the business” of selling guns and 
so under the 1968 Gun Control Act are not required to obtain a federal firearms 
license (FFL).  The only federal restriction on these sales is that the seller cannot 
knowingly provide a gun to someone prohibited by law from having one;
5 the 
seller is not required to conduct a background check to verify eligibility or record 
the sale in any way (Cook, Molliconi and Cole, 1995, Vernick and Hepburn, 
2003). 
 
Both Illinois and Chicago have extended these federal regulations, 
including those for secondary-market sales.  The state requires all gun owners to 
obtain a Firearm Owners ID card and bans private transfer of a gun to anyone 
lacking such a card.  The city goes still farther, since 1982 essentially banning 
handguns except for those already in circulation that were then registered with 
the city.  Furthermore, there are almost no legal firearms retailers operating in the 
                                                 
4 Cook and Ludwig (2003b) show that burglary rates appear to be higher in areas where gun 
ownership is more common.  Counties with higher levels of household gun ownership have teens 
who are more likely to carry guns (Cook and Ludwig, 2004a) and have relatively higher homicide 
rates and perhaps suicide rates as well (Duggan, 2001, 2003; Cook and Ludwig, 2005); 
availability to high-risk people is a plausible mechanism for these results. 
5 The federal Gun Control Act bans possession by a number of categories of individuals, 
including convicted felons, those under indictment, and those convicted of a domestic violence 
offense.   Individuals under age 18 are barred from possession of a handgun unless under 
supervision.   4 
city, so that a private citizen seeking to buy a firearm of any sort must travel 
outside of city limits.
6 
 
A. Gun Prevalence 
 
Compared with other metropolitan areas, the Chicago area has low levels 
of household gun ownership.  This was true prior to the adoption of the handgun 
ban, and prevalence has not been much affected by the ban.  We measure 
household gun ownership using the best available proxy, the ratio of firearm 
suicides to total suicides, or FSS (Azrael, Cook and Miller, 2004, Cook and 
Ludwig, 2005).  We can calculate FSS from Vital Statistics mortality data for 
Cook County, which is dominated by Chicago.  In 1981, the year before Chicago 
enacted its handgun ban, FSS in Cook County was 35.7% compared to 49.4% 
nationwide in urban counties (100,000 or more residents).  Figure 1 shows 5-
year averages of FSS and reveals that Cook County experienced a temporary 
dip in gun ownership rates following Chicago’s handgun ban in 1982.
7  However 
a simple difference-in-differences estimate suggests this is not due to the ban, 
since from 1978-82 to 1983-87 the dip in FSS in Cook County (-4.3 percentage 
points) is actually smaller than in surrounding counties unaffected by the 
ordinance (-8.8 points) or in the rest of Illinois (-6.0 points). 
 
  Gun ownership rates may have been reduced statewide by a 1968 Illinois 
law requiring licensing of gun owners and limiting secondary sales to licensed 
individuals (Vernick and Hepburn, 2003).  Figure 2 shows that from 1967 to 1975 
FSS increased by 5.5 percentage points in the U.S. as a whole and by 10.7 and 
7.5 percentage points for Illinois’ neighboring states of Indiana and Wisconsin.  In 
contrast in Illinois over the same period FSS declined by 2.1 points.  If these 
bordering states provide a good counterfactual for what would have happened in 
Illinois absent the 1968 law, then a difference-in-difference estimate indicates 
that these regulations depressed gun ownership rates (FSS) by 20-30% of the 
state’s 1967 value. 
 
  Finally, the Chicago Police Department (CPD) has a long-standing 
emphasis on taking guns off the street that may be relevant for the demand and 
supply sides of the underground gun market.  Starting in the 1950s the CPD has 
emphasized a policy of “making your presence felt,” which involves getting 
patrolmen out into the community to interact with the public, make vehicle or 
other stops and search for guns as appropriate.  At least during the 1950s and 
1960s officers who confiscated illegal guns were provided with departmental 
citations.
8  During the period 1999-2003, the Chicago Police Department 
                                                 
6 The exceptions apparently include one FFL in Chicago that sells via mail order, and a local 
museum that has a FFL as part of its gun collection. 
7 When we isolate FS/S for Chicago itself the value of the FS/S gun proxy actually increases over 
time, from a value of 36% in 1981 to 38% in 1987-9 to 42% in 1993-5. 
8 Personal communication of Philip Cook with Herman Goldstein, August 18, 2004.   5 
averaged over 10,000 firearms confiscations per year, which appears to be far in 
excess of other large cities.
9   
 
B. Imports to the Underground Market 
 
    The sources of guns in Chicago’s underground gun market include guns 
already in the city prior to the 1982 ban, together with handguns imported illegally 
into the city.  Some information concerning the importers operating in this market 
comes from the intensive field interviews conducted by one member of our 
research team, Sudhir Venkatesh (hereafter SV) in two high-crime 
neighborhoods on the city’s South Side, Grand Boulevard/Washington Park (or 
GB/WP) during a 15-month period beginning in 2001 (see the data appendix). 
 
    SV’s interviews revealed that importation of guns into the GB/WP 
neighborhoods is handled by a small number of elite suppliers or wholesalers.  
During his field observation period, there were never more than six such 
wholesalers in operation at once, only one of whom had an affiliation with a gang.  
(The fact that gangs are not involved in importation is an interesting fact to which 
we return later).  Interviews with 12 of the importers who were in business at 
some point over the course of the study period suggest they in turn rely on a 
stable set of “finders” who obtain guns through personal connections in 
Chicago’s poor inner-ring suburbs.  Some finders may also be serving as 
conduits for people trafficking guns from Southern states that have laxer gun 
regulations. 
 
  The GB/WP neighborhoods are similar to the rest of the city with respect 
to the types and sources of guns being used by criminals.  Table 1 provides a 
statistical description of the characteristics of guns confiscated by Chicago police 
during the period 1999-2003.  Information on make, model, and source state are 
tabulated. (The source-state information is generated by the National Tracing 
Center of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, which attempts to trace 
each gun to its first retail transaction.  The appendix provides more details.) 
10  
                                                 
9 Chicago Police Department, Annual Report: 2003 Year in Review.  By comparison, from 1999-
2001 a total of around 12,000 guns of all types were confiscated each year in New York State as 
a whole (Council of the City of New York, Office of Communications, September 12, 2003, 
“Committee Hears Testimony on Proposals to Stem the Flow of Illegal Guns Into the City). 
10 An earlier analysis of Chicago trace data reported that 60% of traced guns recovered in violent 
Index crimes between 1995 and 1998 were first purchased within the Chicago metropolitan 
region (Block, Brice, and Galary, 2003).  When our analyses are limited to Chicago guns 
recovered in violent Index crimes, we still find that only 36.4% were first purchased in Cook 
County, and 44.5% in the nine counties of the Chicago SMA.  There seems to be at least three 
explanations for the disparate results.  First, the comprehensiveness of Chicago ATF trace data 
improved substantially between the study time periods.  Chicago did not participate in ATF’s 
Youth Crime Gun Interdiction Initiative (YCGII) program until 1998 (ATF, 1999).  The YCGII 
program requires participating cities to submit all guns recovered by police departments to ATF 
for tracing.  Before 1998, the CPD was not required to engage in comprehensive tracing of 
recovered crime guns.  Therefore, the previous analysis may not include all guns recovered in 
Chicago violent Index crimes between 1995 and 1997.  Second, the quality of ATF trace data   6 
 
III. Transactions in the Underground Market 
 
  The underground gun market in Chicago appears to be characterized by a 
relatively small volume of transactions, low gun quality, high prices and often 
substantial difficulty in arranging transactions.  We argue that the frictions in this 
market are most likely due to the combination of illegality and market “thinness.” 
 
A.  Volume of Transactions 
 
The underground market in firearms is a small part of the overall 
underground economy.  We estimate that there are no more than 1,400 gun 
sales per year in the GB/WP area,
11 or about 1 sale per year for every 30 people 
living in this very high-crime neighborhood.  By comparison there would probably 
be at least 200,000 and perhaps as many as 500,000 or 1 million cocaine sales 
in the GB / WP community every year – a difference of up to three orders of 
magnitude.  Total revenue in this community for gun sales would be on the order 
of $200,000 to $500,000, compared to perhaps $10 or $20 million in the market 
for cocaine.
12  Our findings in this sense are quite consistent with those reported 
by Koper and Reuter (1997).  Presumably part of the explanation for the low 
                                                                                                                                                 
improved dramatically in 1999 (Pierce, Braga, Hyatt, and Koper, 2004).  In addition to 
administrative and information technology improvements in the tracing system, 1999 was the first 
year that ATF traced all firearms to their first retail sale regardless of the length of time between 
first retail sale and subsequent recovery in crime.  Prior to 1999, ATF did not trace guns that were 
manufactured prior to 1990.  Not surprisingly, only 35% of Chicago violent-crime guns were 
traced to a dealer in the previous study, whereas 57% of the violent-crime guns in our study were 
successfully traced  Finally, research evidence suggests that illegal gun markets are sensitive to 
changes in enforcement policy and legislative changes.  In Boston, Braga and Pierce (2005) 
found that a gun trafficking enforcement program significantly reduced the percentage of new 
handguns recovered in crime.  Cook and Braga (2001) reported a large shift in the source states 
of guns recovered in Chicago that were first sold after the Brady Act was implemented.  It is 
possible that focused enforcement initiatives implemented by the CPD and ATF may account for 
the smaller proportion of guns first purchased in Chicago suburbs between the two time periods. 
 
11 SV interviewed five gun “brokers,” discussed in more detail below, who report an average 
number of gun transactions during the past year of 16.  We knew of 24 brokers working during 
the 15 month period of our fieldwork, and believe there were no more than 5 or 10 additional 
brokers not known to us, so we conservatively assume 34 total brokers in operation in the GB / 
PW neighborhood, who (if our group of 5 interviewees is representative) would have facilitated a 
total of 544 sales.  Gun suppliers report that 60-80% of their sales are negotiated through brokers 
(we assume the 80% figure) and by our own estimates gun suppliers account for around half of 
all gun sales in the GB/WP community, implying a total of around 1,360 gun sales per year.  
There are about 48,000 residents in the combined GB/WP neighborhoods. 
12 Our thanks to Peter Reuter for these drug market calculations.  He notes that each year in the 
U.S. there are perhaps 250 tons of pure cocaine, sold in pure units of 250 milligrams, suggesting 
around 1 billion sales nationwide each year.  If we assume the national rate applies in the South 
Side GB/WP neighborhood then there would be around 200,000 transactions, but given that this 
area is unusually disadvantaged there could plausibly be as many as 500,000 or even a million 
sales per year.   7 
volume of transactions is that guns are durable goods.  As we argue below, the 
thinness of this market is a key fact in understanding how the market functions.  
 
B.  Quality of Guns 
 
  Prevailing wisdom about the demand for gun quality in the underground 
market is nicely summarized by Wright and Sheley (1992, p. 33):  “No military 
force willingly enters battle with inferior weapons, and likewise, no central city 
resident would willingly carry anything other than the best small arms available.” 
On the other hand, some criminologists, such as Kennedy, Piehl, and Braga 
(1996), have observed that criminals may tend to acquire low quality guns in 
practice even though some express a desire for high-quality guns.  ATF’s top-ten 
crime-gun lists (e.g. ATF 2000b) have long noted the prevalence of cheap guns 
used in crime. 
 
 We find that preferences for gun quality are heterogeneous, and in fact a 
portion of the demand for guns consists of consumers who know very little about 
guns and are mostly interested in having one for show rather than to shoot. 
 
In the GB/WP community the potential consumers for guns can be usefully 
partitioned into four groups, by age and degree of criminal involvement.  The 
demand for guns tends to be most discriminating among older and more 
criminally active people. SV’s younger informants seek guns for the status they 
confer, rather than as inputs into a crime production function.  With status goods 
economists sometimes refer metaphorically to “arms races,” but in the market for 
guns among young people there seems to be a literal arms race at work.  As one 
young gang member notes, in the absence of having a gun:  “Who [is] going to 
fear me?  Who [is] going to take me seriously?  Nobody.  I’m a pussy unless I got 
my gun.” 
 
Just showing rather than actually firing guns is usually sufficient for the 
purposes of achieving the desired result.  As one youth noted, “You have to let 
[other people] see it without letting them see it.  See, it’s all about them not 
messing with you.”  As another youth noted, “… Like them slick flicks 
[pornographic movies], it’s all about the bulge.  It never even gets that far 
[explicitly showing other people the gun].”  One non-gang affiliated youth notes:
13 
 
“When I bought [my .357], no, I didn’t see if it was good [working].  Look 
man, I can get one of those guns that fires, but shit, sometimes you just 
need to show it, you know, and you get the respect you looking for.  And, 
                                                 
13 Similarly, another non-gang affiliated youth notes:  “Some of these niggers do have a gun that 
could kill you, that’s true.  Thing is, see, it ain’t really about fighting or nothing, because even if 
you have a group of guys and you see a group of guys, lot of times, it’s just you show ‘em you got 
one, they show you they got one, and you just be on your way.  It’s just like signifying that you 
prepared … I got this [.38 Smith and Wesson] – it don’t work.  My Davis [another manufacturer] 
don’t work either, but I usually carry that one.  I mean it probably don’t look scary or nothing, but it 
does what I need it to do.”   8 
this thing was big man, I didn’t give a shit if it fired or not, I could have 
killed somebody with it just hitting them over the head!” 
 
  These youth also tend to be quite ignorant about gun quality and general 
gun use.  Fewer than one in ten of the 190 non-gang affiliated youth SV 
interviewed had ever been taught how to use a gun.
14  This ignorance matters for 
the gun market in a variety of ways.  For example firearms come in different 
calibers (barrel diameters) and will only fire ammunition of the same caliber.  The 
most common way for users that SV interviewed to determine the correct 
ammunition for their firearm was to purchase many bullets on the street from 
suppliers, or to borrow bullets from friends and relatives, and attempt to fit them 
into the firearm. 
   
Older gang members and professional criminals tend to be more 
discerning.  One older gang affiliate recounts his gun preferences for the 
purposes of robbing commercial establishments, especially for daytime robbery: 
 
“When [cashiers] see that Glock [manufacturer of popular 9mm semi-
automatic pistols] or that .38 [caliber handgun] – I mean, a .44 [caliber] 
would be better, but that’s hard to find around here – then you get that 
cash quick.  You don’t want to be keeping one of them sissy weapons.” 
 
But even for those regularly engaged in crime, gun use was typically 
limited to simply brandishing the weapon and so ensuring that a broken gun (as 
long as it was not obviously broken) had some value.  For example of the 57 
older gang members SV interviewed, only around 10% admitted to having fired 
their gun during a robbery.
15  
   
The patterns of gun demand reported in SV’s interviews are consistent 
with the results from administrative ATF data on confiscated crime guns.  Table 3 
shows that the crime guns confiscated from juveniles (under 18) are on average 
of lower quality than those confiscated from youth (18-24) or adults (25 or older), 
where “quality” here is measured by gun age or expected retail price for the 
                                                 
14 For example one youth, “Tony,” narrated a common learning experience: 
  SV: “So, how did you know what to do with the .38?” 
T: “I took it, started putting bullets in.  Hell, I even put a rock in there and tried to fire it!  
You know, I just fiddled with it.” 
  SV: “Did it fire?” 
  T: “I’m not sure.  I think it did.” 
SV: “Well, that’s kind of like saying ‘I might be pregnant.’  Either it fired or it didn’t.” 
  T: “I mean it made a noise.” 
SV: “Um, hmm. A noise.  So, you really don’t know anything about guns except possibly 
how to kill yourself.” 
  T: “Listen, it’s not like we get taught that in school.” 
 
15 One informant described his technique for robbing drug dealers, firing a shotgun through the 
dealer’s door in order to “buy yourself some time to steal their shit because it makes so much 
noise… and they need to see you mean business.”   9 
same make and model, estimated from the firearms Blue Book.  (Unfortunately 
the ATF records do not indicate whether the guns are in working order.)  These 
patterns are similar in both the GB/WP neighborhoods and in the rest of Chicago.  
The lower quality of guns among younger people is presumably due to some 
combination of differences in preferences for gun quality by age and income 
effects.  Table 4 shows that the fraction of crime guns confiscated because of 
weapons offenses (such as carrying the gun in public) rather than for more 
serious criminal activity such as violent or narcotics crimes is higher for juveniles 
compared to older people, especially in the high-crime GB/WP neighborhood 
where guns may be especially important status items for teens. 
 
Note that the presence of buyers who are indifferent to whether a gun is in 
working order helps explain how the gun market handles the problem that guns 
are “experience goods”– sellers for obvious reasons discourage buyers from test-
firing the gun during the transaction.  But the same information problem that 
faces buyers – a non-working gun is typically observationally equivalent to a 
working gun – means that youth can “produce” the ultimate services of interest 
(status, intimidation) with a broken gun as easily as with a working gun. 
   
C.  Prices 
 
Interviews by SV with 116 gun-owning non-gang affiliated youth (under 22 
years) reveal prices paid that range between $250 and $400, with groups of 
youth often joining together to purchase a gun collectively.
16  Interviews with 11 
local gun brokers, who handle a large share of retail transactions on behalf of 
importers, suggest most of their guns are sold for between $150 and $350.  
These data provide suggestive evidence for price discrimination against youth, 
either because youth are more difficult to deal with (which many brokers report to 
SV) or because brokers know youth have fewer connections in the underground 
market and so are unable to shop around.  The market frictions that we describe 
below may help limit resale opportunities and so facilitate some price-
discrimination by brokers. 
   
The prices quoted to SV in his field interviews are generally consistent 
with those reported by 1,194 arrestees interviewed in Chicago in 1996-7 as part 
                                                 
16 In the inner city, it is common for youth and young adults to share ownership of a gun. In other 
words, a gun may be claimed as property by several friends or kin. They may have pooled 
resources to purchase the weapon, for example. Symbolically, this arrangement enables several 
people to derive the status that a gun can afford a young person. It poses some methodological 
problems because “gun ownership” in the conventional sense (of a gun owned by an individual) 
may not always apply in inner city contexts. Thus, a 
researcher interviewing all members of a peer group may hear reports of the existence of several 
guns, whereas only one actually exists.  Wherever possible, SV tried to ensure that this over-
count did not 
occur during interviews and conversations, but we cannot be certain that every instance was 
eliminated. 
   10 
of the U.S. Department of Justice’s Drug Use Forecasting (DUF) system (see 
data appendix).  Table 5 shows that of the 20% of Chicago arrestees who have 
ever owned a gun, more than two-thirds report having paid between $100 and 
$499 for their most recent gun, with a median price of $150.  The second column 
restricts the analytic sample to just adult males; they report a median price of 
$100, a pattern that is consistent with the suggestive findings from SV’s 
interviews about price discrimination against youth. 
 
  These street prices for guns in Chicago seem high given that many of 
these guns are of low quality, manufactured by companies such as Lorcin, Raven 
and Bryco.  (These names are often mentioned to SV in interviews and also 
show up frequently in ATF data for confiscated crime guns).  While SV’s 
interviews do not include information on the condition of the gun, it is noteworthy 
that most pistols from these manufacturers listed on websites (such as 
gunsamerica.com) sell for between $50 and $100 (with a $10 mailing / 
transaction fee), even used guns that are reported to be in “excellent condition.”
17  
Thus the markup in the underground market is substantial.
18   
 
D. Transaction Costs 
 
  SV’s interviews together with the DUF surveys are also consistent in 
pointing to substantial transaction costs in Chicago’s underground gun market.  
The discussions held by SV on the city’s South Side provide three types of 
support for this assertion: 
 
·  A system of local brokers has developed to facilitate market exchange 
and typically charge $30 to $50 per transaction, a large percentage of 
the sales price.  These brokers capitalize on the information they have 
about the local underground economy – of the 11 brokers SV 
interviewed, all were over 30 and long-time residents of the area, and 
most were either participants in or closely connected to suppliers in the 
illegal markets for sex, gypsy cabs, or unregulated car repair or 
hairstyling. 
·  Even local gun brokers report that a large share of their transaction 
attempts goes unfulfilled – around 30-40%.  Reasons included the 
inability to get a gun from a supplier; the customer and broker could 
not agree on the location for the transaction; and the broker either did 
not trust the customer’s intentions or thought he or she was an 
undercover police officer.
19 
                                                 
17 Under federal law guns can only be sent by mail to licensed dealers, so these web sites require 
some FFL to broker the sale. 
18 The street markup for illicit drugs such as heroin and cocaine appears to be higher (Koper and 
Reuter, 1997).  But the closer analogy is with prescription drugs that are diverted into illicit 
transactions, such as with oxycontin or Ritalin. 
19 In other cases, the transaction failed because the customer failed to bring enough cash to the 
transaction or tried to negotiate down the price   11 
·  Interviews with 17 young adults who consider themselves “regular” 
thieves, self-defined as deriving a substantial share of income from 
crime and engaging in at least four thefts per year, further support the 
general finding.  Of the 17 interviewees in this group, only one person 
said they could find a gun in less than a week.   
 
Youths who are not affiliated with a gang would be expected to have 
greater difficulty in making an arms-length connection than others.  In SV’s 116 
interviews with non-gang affiliated youth who had owned a gun, 40% reported 
obtaining their gun from a relative.
20 The importance of family sources for this 
group is consistent with previous surveys of criminally-active youth (see Koper 
and Reuter, 1997). 
 
Somewhat more systematic data on high transaction costs in Chicago’s 
underground gun market comes from the government’s surveys of Chicago 
arrestees as part of the DUF system (Table 5).  Of Chicago arrestees interviewed 
by DUF who had never owned a gun but indicated they might want one someday 
(just under one-quarter of those who never had a gun), fully 61% indicated that it 
would take them more than one week to get a gun.  These DUF findings are 
quite consistent with the results of SV’s field interviews, and also suggest that 
scarcity and frictions in the underground gun market cannot be fully overcome by 
turning to non-market sources of guns. 
 
One puzzle raised by these findings is why people tolerate these 
transaction costs given that suburban gun dealers are just a short drive away 
from any city neighborhood (at least outside of rush hour).  Even those people 
who are themselves ineligible to buy a gun from a dealer can get someone else, 
usually a wife or girlfriend, to make a “straw purchase” on their behalf if she 
obtained an Illinois Firearm Owners ID (FOID) card.  Yet Table 6 suggests that 
guns recently purchased in the Chicago suburbs of Cook County account for only 
around one-tenth of the city’s crime guns, with only about a fifth of these guns (2 
percent of the total) first having been purchased by a female.
21  Straw purchases 
reduce one type of transaction cost but increase legal exposure (since dealers 
record the identity of the official purchaser).  There may also be transaction costs 
of a different sort associated with traveling outside of the individual’s own 
neighborhood, including the dangers of crossing gang boundaries.  As one gang 
leader notes: 
 
                                                 
20 In addition, 35% obtained their gun from someone affiliated with a gang; 17% from a licensed 
security guard; 6% from a broker; and 2% from some other source. 
 
21 Our finding that straw purchasing is rare in Chicago’s underground gun market is consistent 
with results from interviews with incarcerated juveniles in Maryland, who also report rarely leaving 
their communities to get guns (Webster et al., 2002).  It is possible that increased enforcement by 
Chicago Police Department and ATF over the course of the 1990s made it less attractive for gun 
traffickers to use females as straw purchasers of new guns at nearby licensed dealers.     12 
“Most of us, we never been outside these four or five blocks, our 
neighborhood.  Now, how can you bring the guns here if you don’t even 
know how to get to other places? … Even if we go to jail, we really spend 
most of our time around where we live, where we work.” 
 
E.  Why Is There Friction in the Underground Gun Market? 
 
  Why are there persistent market frictions in Chicago’s underground gun 
market?  We believe the most likely answer is market “thinness” together with 
illegality of gun transactions in Chicago.  The prohibition on gun sales in Chicago 
introduces trade frictions, and moves us away from what Diamond (1982) 
describes as the “fictional Walrasian auctioneer” that is usually assumed to 
facilitate exchange.  Illegality makes it difficult to advertise, and so trade requires 
some search effort by both buyers and sellers with some probability of failure that 
is inversely related to overall market activity. 
 
The information problems that arise in linking buyers and sellers in 
markets with trade frictions are exacerbated in an illegal market by the fact that 
buyers and sellers now also require information about prospective trading 
partners in order to engage in exchange.  In an analysis of drug law-enforcement 
strategy, Mark Moore points out that “…what is consistently difficult about drug 
trafficking is the process of reliably executing large financial transactions in a 
crooked world with no police or courts to enforce the contracts (Moore 1990, p. 
138).”  In this market, reliable “connections” are scarce and vulnerable to law-
enforcement pressure.  The underground market for guns in Chicago does not 
involve large amounts of money, but executing transactions with strangers is 
surely a risky business. The buyer may be an undercover police officer or 
potential informant, or simply dangerous. One gun dealer explained to SV his 
preference for relying on brokers to negotiate sales rather than dealing directly 
with customers:
22   
 
“You never know who these niggers are that need these things.  
Sometimes they just act crazy on you, ‘cause you know, if I want a gun, 
then usually you pissed off.  And, I don’t like messing with these fools, 
‘cause they sometimes don’t pay, they steal your shit.  And, you know, 
they could be working for the cops, too, so I got to trust the folks I’m 
working with.” 
 
  Diamond’s (1982) stochastic search model provides an explanation for 
why thinness hampers trade in a market such as that for guns in Chicago, where 
buyers and sellers search for trustworthy trading partners and 30-40% of 
transaction attempts even by retail brokers in high-crime neighborhoods go 
unfulfilled.  In this type of environment economic activities can create trading 
externalities and positive feedback effects:  “The externality comes from the 
                                                 
22 The account suggests part of the broker’s fee is rent on broker information, and part is 
compensation for the unavoidable risks associated with selling guns.   13 
plausible assumption that an increase in the number of potential trading partners 
makes trade easier.  The positive feedback is that easier trade, in turn, makes 
production more profitable” (Diamond, 1982, p. 882).
 23 
 
Consistent with the predictions of Diamond’s model, the limited number of 
potential transactions does discourage supply.  As one gang leader explained to 
SV about why his organization does not sell guns:  “It’s really not worth it 
because not that many people buying.”  The Chicago PD’s emphasis on policing 
guns seems to introduce some fixed costs to selling guns, since the legal risk 
may be only weakly related to the number of guns sold.  As a gang leader 
explains to SV, “…Police don’t like [guns] moving around here, man.  We stay 
away from that shit, see, ‘cause we already got enough trouble with them 
[police].”  Many of those sellers who are involved with the gun market have 
diversified into multiple markets  – of the brokers SV interviewed in South Side 




Note that it is the combination of illegality and thinness that seems to be 
the key for creating the frictions and trading externalities that characterize the 
underground gun market in Chicago.  If the market were illegal but thick, as for 
narcotics, institutions would develop to facilitate exchange, and sellers and 
buyers would have incentives to develop reputations (Koper and Reuter, 1997).  
For example drug-selling corners have developed in that market and seem to 
change locations easily in response to law-enforcement pressures, given that 
buyers and sellers are closely connected and so information about changes in 
trading locations is easily transmitted back and forth.  In contrast in the 
underground gun market some white ethnic street gangs or gun importers help 
organize fist-fighting events in the city’s warehouses, but these occur only every 
3-4 months.  The coordination costs of moving these fighting events in response 
to legal or other threats is greater than with relocating a drug corner, and so 
these events are advertised only among a selected clientele.
25 
                                                 
23 Gan and Li (2004) note other models yield different predictions about whether match rates will 
in fact be lower in “thin” markets, and that to date there is very little empirical evidence on this 
point (especially outside of the labor market context). 
24 Mark Moore (1981) analyzed black-market firms encountered by ATF undercover 
investigations.  In Chicago/northern Illinois during the period 1974-1976, he found that only 4 of 
the 13 “firms” observed by ATF were conducting as many as 5 transactions per month.  In 
general, research has found that gun traffickers do not divert many guns over the course of their 
illicit enterprise.  ATF (2000a) found that 43% of 1,530 gun trafficking investigations made in the 
United States between July 1996 and December 1998 involved the diversion of 10 guns or less.  
In Boston, the average ATF gun trafficking investigation made between July 1996 and December 
2003 involved the illegal diversion of 16 guns (Braga and Pierce, 2005). 
25 At these fist-fighting events usually 6 to 18 cars are parked around the “ring,” with guns 
displayed in the trunks.  Drug sales are usually discouraged, and security is provided by the 
“home field” gang and reinforced by a ban on ammunition sales.  Fist-fighting events provide one 
of the few occasions when importers are willing to deal directly with customers.   Importers are 
also careful to try to sell only working guns to ensure that fight organizers invite them to sell at   14 
 
Market makers can also easily develop in thin but legal markets.  For 
example, eBay has special sections of its website devoted to the markets for 
antique dolls (pre-1930), Annette Funicello bears, imitation pearl pins and 
brooches, and game-used Major League Baseball memorabilia.
26  In contrast the 
thinness of the underground gun market limits the economic incentives for 
entrepreneurs to become market makers, not surprising if this activity entails 
some fixed costs – there are few participants in the gun market because there 
are few participants in the gun market. 
 
Since the gun market is so thin and sales opportunities are limited, market 
makers (brokers) are those people who already have information about the 
trustworthiness of potential sellers and buyers as a byproduct of other activities.  
As noted above, most of the people who serve as retail brokers in the 
underground gun market are involved in some way with other underground 
activities such as unlicensed car repair or hairstyling.  Several of the prostitutes 
interviewed by SV also indicate that they periodically brokered a gun acquisition.  
We might also expect a large share of gun sales to be made by drug dealers, yet 
SV’s reports suggest this is not the case.  Drug dealers seem to be wary of 
jeopardizing the profits associated with drugs for modest gains from diversifying 
into guns, given the Chicago PD’s gun emphasis and federal laws that provide 
for sentence enhancements for combined gun-drug offenses.  SV’s field data on 
the limited involvement of drug dealers with gun sales are consistent with data 
from the 1996-7 DUF reports by Chicago arrestees, only 40% of whom agree 
with the statement that “if you want a gun, drug dealers will be able to get one for 
you,” and with the fact that very few people arrested in Illinois from 1990-2001 for 
drug dealing were in possession of guns.
27 
   
IV. Gangs and the Underground Gun Market 
 
Chicago is infamous for its powerful criminal gangs, dating back to 
Prohibition and before.  A gang creates a social network within which gun 
transactions can be accomplished with relatively little risk.  The gang leadership 
has information about the reliability of its members and can make a credible 
threat to punish misbehavior. Interestingly the kinds of transactions that arm 
youthful gang members are typically not one-time sales, but loans or rental 
arrangements with strings attached.  The constraints on gun transactions within a 
gang are motivated in part by the desire by leaders to prevent hostile takeovers, 
                                                                                                                                                 
future events as well – that is, repeat transactions with these fighting events facilitate the 
development of reputations. 
26 See www.ebay.com 
27 We find that only a very small share of all drug arrestees are also charged with weapons 
offenses as part of the same arrest event, and that only a small share of those arrested for 
weapons offenses are charged with drug offenses.  This evidence is obviously imperfect in part 
because conglomerates could keep their drug and gun inventories separate, and so 
apprehension for the illegal sale of one good need not involve police discovery of the seller’s 
inventory of the complementary good.   15 
and because gun violence depresses profits in the short term by scaring away 
drug customers and bringing unwanted police attention.  The fact that people join 
gangs for access to guns even with these constraints, and the assumption by 
police that gang members obtained their guns from the gang, provide additional 
support for our findings above about high transaction costs in the gun market. 
 
  Gangs also provide one explanation for why the underground gun market 
in Chicago seems to have considerable friction, yet gun crime (at least by some 
measures) is not much lower in Chicago than other cities. 
 
A.  Gangs and the Underground Economy 
 
  The economic objectives of modern street gangs are central to 
understanding the nature of the gang’s involvement in the underground gun 
market.  While historically gangs were often organized for defensive or social 
purposes (Klein, 1995),
28 over time gangs have undergone a process of 
“corporatization” (Taylor, 1990, Levitt and Venkatesh, 2000).  The most important 
income-generating activity of the gangs studied by SV on the South Side of 
Chicago is the distribution of illegal drugs (see Levitt and Venkatesh, 2000 for 
more details).  The gang also “taxes” other activities in the underground economy 
that occur on the gang’s turf.
29 
 
  Violence can help or hurt the gang’s corporate interests, depending on the 
circumstance and time horizon in question.  Over the long run the gang’s 
capacity and reputation for violence helps protect the gang’s local monopoly over 
drug distribution and extortion.  But in the short term violence, particularly gun 
violence, can scare away drug customers
30 and bring additional law enforcement 
attention. 
 
  Gangs are not active suppliers in the underground gun market in part 
because the meager profits associated with selling guns are outweighed by gains 
to the gang from its monopoly over the capacity for serious violence.  Gang 
leaders also seek to preserve this monopoly within the gang itself to prevent 
hostile takeovers, which is a threat in part because of the skewed earnings 
distribution within the gang (see Levitt and Venkatesh, 2000).  For example as 
one gang officer reports to SV:  “[Our superiors] want us to tell them who have a 
gun because they fearing that someone may try to take over from the inside.” 
 
  The gang’s other economic interests also provide gang leaders with an 
incentive to restrict access to guns and gun misuse by members.  As one gang 
                                                 
28 Akerlof and Kranton (2000) provide another explanation for gangs – the utility from identity. 
29 The fact that the gang taxes rather than supplies these activities directly is presumably due to 
some combination of fixed costs to entry into some underground industries and coordination 
costs within the gang beyond some point that lead to diseconomies of scale. 
30 Levitt and Venkatesh (2000) show that gang revenues decline substantially during periods of 
gang war.   16 
leader explains to SV about why he tries to limit gun use by the gang’s local 
affiliates:   “If they don’t have guns, they don’t cause a lot of trouble, nobody 
[from the police] comes down on them, things just flow [and we make our 
money].  And, if they need a gun, then we’ll give it to them.”  Another gang leader 
expressed his frustration about gun use by gang alumni: 
 
“It’s like these niggers get stupid after they leave.  I mean, they know not 
to keep a gun on them when they do this [engage in income-generating 
crime], ‘cause the cops hate that shit.  I mean, they could use a knife or 
something.  Why the gun?  That just brings down [the police] on us really, 
I mean, that’s the thing that happens all the time, [the gang] gets blamed 
and we get shut down.” 
 
  Police typically assume that gang members or alumni caught in 
possession of a gun obtained the weapon from the gang and so crack down on 
the gang accordingly.
31  As one police officer noted to SV: 
 
“Look, I’ll be honest with you.  There will always be drugs, drug dealing 
and drug dealers.  The reason we get tight on guns is that it’s better that 
there be drugs and no one gets killed than if someone gets killed.  We 
love guns!  We love getting them because it makes the job easier on the 
street.  So, when we find one, yes, we really go after them [gang leaders] 
because they know the rules.  They know the agreement, and if we get a 
gun, that means they broke it.” 
 
B. Gun Transactions within Gangs 
 
  Compared to the rest of the underground gun market, gangs are like 
islands of availability.  But economic considerations cause gang leaders to run 
these islands like Fidel Castro’s Cuba, with many restrictions on gun transactions 
and use. 
 
  In principle the information available within the gang about the gang’s 
resources and reliability of individual members can help overcome many of the 
problems that seem to plague the underground gun market in Chicago.  And in 
fact many respondents reported to SV that they joined or stay in the gang to 
preserve access to guns.  As one former gang member notes, “You never leave 
[the gang] before you got the gun, because after you leave, they don’t really have 
no reason to help you get one.” 
 
                                                 
31 During SV’s fieldwork on the GB / WP neighborhood, 43 gang members exited out of the 2 
largest street gangs in the area, of which 37 continued to work in some capacity in the local 
underground economy (such as selling drugs, committing burglars, fencing, or providing off-the-
books services as day laborers or security guards).  Of this group, 11 were arrested and in every 
case a gun was confiscated.  In 7 of these cases, the police confronted the gang leaders about 
whether they had provided the suspect his gun.     17 
  Yet in practice access to guns within the gang is regulated, with most 
transactions in the form of loans or rentals with strings attached.  The general 
rule is that members can only own guns if authorized by gang leaders.  These 
gang leaders in turn ration gun ownership in part on the basis of statistical 
discrimination by age.  “Shorties,” young rank-and-file members ages who often 
want guns for social status, are typically authorized to access guns during gang 
wars (though even then many shorties are only allowed to carry knives), drug 
sales (at least for the one member of the 4-6 member drug selling team assigned 
to provide security), and drug pick-ups and drop-offs outside the gang’s own turf.  
Older gang members are less likely to use guns in ways that are contrary to the 
gang’s economic interests both because age may reduce impulsivity and 
because many older members maintain gang affiliation for primarily economic 
reasons.  Gang leaders also value the human capital developed by experienced 
gang members and so are more likely to formally or informally waive the gang’s 
rules on gun ownership for older members.  As one gang official notes, “The way 
we do it is that we just don’t write down that [the older guys] are carrying 
something.”  Gang leaders also use access to guns as an incentive for 
performance within the gang; for example, within some gangs the custom is to 
provide a gun to members who successfully execute authorized drive-by 
shootings. 
 
  The gang leaders share the interests of local law enforcement in reducing 
gun access, particularly among the more impulsive younger gang members.  
Consistent with the observation that shorties typically want guns for social rather 
than economic reasons, most violations by younger members are associated 
with social situations such as sporting events, parties, and some unauthorized 
gun use against enemy gangs as part of thefts or drive-by shootings.  The 
standard punishment for violation of these gang rules includes a physical beating 
by the gang’s security team, a monetary fine and, in some cases where an 
unauthorized gun is confiscated by the police, expulsion from the gang and 
assault in prison by the gang’s incarcerated affiliates.  But gang leaders admit to 
some inconsistency in the enforcement of these rules. 
 
  Sometimes gang leaders actually enlist the police as agents in controlling 
gun use among younger members by notifying the police about unauthorized gun 
possession by rank-and-file shorties.  In this scenario the police usually 
confiscate the gun but do not make an arrest, which helps reduce enforcement 
costs to both gangs and the police.  As one police officer reports to SV: 
 
 “Yes, I suppose I’ll admit that on occasion, we will act on a call from [the 
gang leaders].  We prefer to have the guns off of the street.  That is our 
first priority.  It’s hard, we cannot stop guns from coming through here, but 
these kind of arrangements help us to control who gets hurt.  That’s not 
good policing some would say, but they are not seeing what I see every 
day.” 
   18 
  So how common is gun ownership among gang members?  One gang 
leader reports to SV that his gang records gun ownership among 25% of gang 
members, and estimates that another 5% owned guns but didn’t officially report 
them to the gang’s leaders.
32  This figure is about 1.5 times as high as the 
fraction of all arrestees in the Chicago DUF sample who report having ever 
owned a gun (Table 5), consistent with the idea of gangs as islands of availability 
in the underground gun market.  But it is striking that so few members own guns 
given the gang’s capacity to arm most members. 
 
C. Guns and Gangs Across Cities 
 
    The results presented in Section III concerning high prices and transaction 
costs in Chicago’s underground gun market suggest that gun use in crime may 
be rare in that city compared to other places.  Yet this is not obviously the case, 
at least with respect to some measures of gun use.  For example, gun use in 
robbery was less prevalent in Chicago than in other cities but gun use in 
homicide was more prevalent than average.
33 
 
    One explanation for why generally low availability of guns to Chicago 
criminals does not yield unusually low gun use in violent crime is suggested by 
the preceding discussion – the pervasiveness of gangs.  Table 7 shows that 
around 20% of adult male arrestees in the Chicago DUF sample report 
membership in a gang at the time of their arrest, nearly twice as high as the rate 
reported in the next-highest city, Los Angeles.  (We focus on adult male 
arrestees as a simple way to adjust for demographic differences in arrestees 
across cities).  No other city in the DUF sample reports current gang membership 
rates of even one-third Chicago’s level.  Figures for lifetime rather than current 
gang membership also reveal Chicago to be an outlier. 
 
    Interestingly, guns may be difficult for a high proportion of criminals to 
access in most of the DUF cities, not just Chicago.   On average across these 
cities only 36% of adult male arrestees had ever owned a gun.  Of the 20% of 
those who had never owned a gun but thought they might want one someday, 
54% report that it would take them a week or more to get a gun and only about 
one-fifth think they could get a gun within a day. 
 
                                                 
32 These figures are down substantially from the height of the crack epidemic, when gang leaders 
report 40-50% of members owned guns. 
33 For the period 1997-1999, 75 percent of homicides reported by the police in Chicago were 
committed with guns, which is above the national average of 67 percent.  On the other hand, only 
29 percent of Chicago robberies were committed with a gun during this period, compared to a 
national average of 42 percent.   19 
V. Storage
34 
   
Another salient feature of the underground gun market is the shortage of 
an important complement to guns – a reliable place for gun storage.  This 
shortage is particularly relevant for non-gang affiliated youth, many of whom live 
at home with their parents.  Consider the storage challenge for one youth 
interviewed by SV:  
 
“OK, in March, I had my gun at my uncle’s place, but he got kicked out so I 
had to keep it behind our house for a while.  But, I think those niggers 
sleeping out there saw me, so I gave it to Buck [my friend] but, he had to 
give it to the security guard at school.  I hated that nigger, so Buck got it 
back from me and then I gave it to Charlese who kept it in her school 
locker for a while.  But we broke up and now it’s at Tiny’s house.” 
 
The table below presents the distribution of gun storage locations among 
the 116 young (under 22) non-gang affiliated people SV interviewed who owned 
a gun: 
 
  Location    Percentage of guns  
stored in location
35 
  School      43% 
  Home       11% 
  Car        26% 
  Abandoned building 15% 
  Other        5% 
   
The large share of guns stored in school is striking, particularly given that 
school lockers are rarely used to store guns. (When lockers are used they 
usually belong to girlfriends.)  School security personnel play an important role in 
this practice, as explained by one guard:  “Schools are a great place to do [gun] 
business, because police never come in!  Its funny, how much dope, guns, sex, 
all that shit goes down after the kids leave.  As far as guns go, I’d say you 
probably got about 30 to 40 guns, at least, being kept in these schools.”  Another 
guard discusses the incentives:  “You have to understand, we don’t get paid a lot 
[as security guards.]  Some little kid, with a big roll of hundreds comes up to us 
                                                 
34 The data on storage in school settings are based on self-reports by individuals who identified 
themselves as security personnel. We must exercise some caution with these data because of 
the difficulty of finding an independent source to verify their claims. Wherever possible, SV tried 
to obtain information from non- security personnel (e.g., principals, school teachers) that such 
storage was a persistent issue. Today, many of the schools in the fieldsite neighborhood have 
undergone transformation due to demographic shifts and realignments by the Chicago Board of 
Education. As a result, the patterns reported here may well have changed.   
 
35 Note:  “Home” can include private areas outside the house or apartment;  “Car” may include 
someone else’s car.   20 
and says, ‘We’ll give you $500 a month to keep our guns here.’  Hell yeah! I’m 
going to take the money.”
36   
. 
VI. The Market for Ammunition 
 
    Guns are of public policy concern in part because they are more lethal 
than the most likely substitute weapons that assailants would use in their place 
(Zimring, 1968, Cook, 1991).  But guns are only more lethal than other weapons 
when combined with a particularly important complement – ammunition.  
Chicago’s laws essentially ban the possession or sale of ammunition within city 
limits.
37  It may seem plausible that the market for ammunition would have less 
friction than the market for guns; ammo is more consumable than guns and so 
the ammo market may be more active than the gun market. 
 
    However, our findings suggest that if anything the market for ammunition 
appears to have even greater friction than the market for guns.  While older 
professional thieves had reliable sources of ammunition, most other people 
interviewed by SV have trouble securing ammunition and faced considerable 
price markups compared to the legal market.  Waits of 1 to 4 weeks for 
ammunition were not unusual.  As one respondent noted, “You really don’t have 
someone who sells ammo around here, I mean its like you have to hope you an 
get it from [the organization] or maybe [a gun broker].  But you never know, so, 
lots of times its just a waiting thing, where you hope that someone who you got 
the gun from might have some bullets.  But that really never happens, usually it’s 
the gang that sells it or you just know somebody.”  One non-gang affiliated youth 
reported that he spent $50 to get 10 bullets for a Beretta semi-automatic for 
which he had paid $300.  By contrast, for $50 in the legal market one can 
purchase a box of 500 rounds of 9 millimeter ammunition.  The ratio of street to 
legal prices in this case is on the order of 50:1.
38  
 
    An additional indication of ammunition scarcity comes from a census of all 
arrests made in Illinois between 1990 and 2001 obtained from the Illinois State 
Police (see data appendix).  Of the 82,903 arrests for firearm offenses in the ISP 
data, only 2,887 (3.5%) were also charged with the illegal possession of 
ammunition.
39  One professional criminal reports to SV about his efforts to ration 
                                                 
36 It must be emphasized that these interviews were conducted in 2001 and 2002.  Since then the 
Chicago Public Schools have taken a number of new steps to get guns out of schools. 
37 Chicago law forbids the possession of ammunition except if the individual “is the holder of a 
valid registration certificate for a firearm of the same gauge or caliber as the ammunition 
possessed, and has the registration certificate in his possession while in possession of the 
ammunition,” or “is a licensed weapons dealer … or [runs] a licensed shooting gallery or gun 
club.”  Put differently, anyone found in illegal possession of a gun will also by definition be in 
illegal possession of ammunition if the gun is loaded.  Secondary sales of either guns or 
ammunition are illegal by private parties in Chicago. 
38 http://www.ammunitionstore.com/pricelist_ammo4.htm#9mm 
39 In Chicago anyone not allowed to have a handgun is also not allowed to possess ammunition.  
Interviews with the Chicago PD (Rachel Johnston) suggest that whether an additional ammo 
charge will be filed against people with loaded guns is up to the discretion of the arresting officer   21 
ammunition:  “I’m stealing a lot of car radios right now, and sometimes, if I get 
really brave I may try to take a purse.  For that shit, I keep the gun, but I never 
use it, you know.  I don’t even load it, I keep the bullets I got for the bigger shit I 
do.” 
 
    One important problem limiting transactions in the market for ammunition 
is consumer ignorance, described in detail above.  For obvious reasons 
prospective buyers can’t test whether ammunition fits their gun by loading the 
weapon at the time of sale, and so must know the caliber of their gun and the 
ammunition being offered.  Moreover if youth cycle through multiple guns, related 
in part to the storage problems mentioned above, then buying ammunition for a 
given gun entails some risk that the owner’s next gun may be of a different 
caliber thus rendering the bullets at least temporarily useless.  Finally, ignorance 
about how to operate guns makes many users nervous about carrying loaded 
weapons because they did not understand the mechanisms by which the gun 
could accidentally fire (“go off on them”).   
 
    Why don’t gun dealers also distribute ammunition given the 
complementarity between the two goods?  The answer seems to be that 
ammunition and guns are too complementary.  For example 14 of the 22 
professional criminals interviewed by SV, who do have good access to 
ammunition, offered a moral argument for not selling ammo; e.g., “Helping 
someone kill someone else is not what I’m into.  Guns are for protection and for 
business, not for killing,” implying (consistent with our arguments above) that an 
unloaded gun is adequate for most uses.  The remaining eight professional 
criminals suggested that this would threaten other suppliers, or the monopoly 
local gang members try to maintain over lethal violence:  “Are you crazy?  No 
way I’d ever sell ammo. [A local gang leader] would shoot me himself.  Why?  
Because, I could be arming all these people that might want to overtake him.” 
 
VII. Discussion  
 
    Our findings about the presence of substantial transaction costs and price 
mark-ups in Chicago’s underground gun market stand in stark contrast to 
conventional wisdom in the sociology and criminology literatures.  One candidate 
explanation is that previous research has sometimes relied on answers to 
questions that were too vague to provide a measure of actual prices or 
transaction costs.
40   
                                                                                                                                                 
and the state’s attorney.  Because not all people may immediately be charged with possession of 
ammo, in our ISP analysis we also examine charges filed later by the state’s attorney and 
uncover only 3 additional ammo charges. 
40 Our results on search costs and prices contrast with common interpretation of the results of 
Sheley and Wright’s (1998) survey of youth in other parts of the U.S.  In their survey of 16-18 
year old high school students drawn from a convenience sample of 53 schools, 50% reported that 
obtaining a gun would be “little” or “no” trouble if they desired one, while the other half of the 
sample indicated that getting a gun would be “a lot of trouble” or “impossible.”  Yet these   22 
 
    In principle an alternative way to reconcile our findings with previous 
research is that our data are unreliable.  Our study relies in large part on the 
unusually detailed interviews and field observations of Sudhir Venkatesh, which 
in turn rely heavily on self-reports from people who regularly engage in criminal 
or anti-social activities, for which lying is often a useful input. 
 
    However SV’s field observations are generally quite consistent with the 
variety of other data sources that are available to us, including those that do not 
rely on self-reports by criminals.  For example SV’s field interviews about gun 
quality, prices and transaction costs are consistent with data from ATF data on 
confiscated crime guns.
41  Reports to SV about the scarcity of ammunition and 
the limited role of drug dealers in the distribution of guns match up closely with 
data on all arrests made in Chicago during the 1990s obtained from the Illinois 
State Police. 
 
    From a policy perspective the results suggest that law enforcement efforts 
targeted at reducing gun availability at the street level seem promising.  The 
possibility of buy-and-bust or sell-and-bust operations by undercover police 
officers further erodes trust in the underground gun market and increases the 
information requirements for successful exchange.  Similarly, offering rewards for 
information about gun sellers and possessors, either in the form of cash or 
leniency for the informant’s own legal difficulties, should further inhibit the flow of 
information in the underground market, which consists primarily of word-of-mouth 
within social networks.  Providing informants with incentives might also reduce 
the value of guns to youth for social status, since public display of a firearm 
would now entail additional legal risk.
42  
 
    If “thinness begets thinness” in the underground gun market, as suggested 
by the trading externalities arising in the search model of Diamond (1982), then 
the impact of stepped-up enforcement activities may be subject to multiplier 
                                                                                                                                                 
questions are quite ambiguous; what is a “little” trouble?  How would a youth who could get a gun 
in 1-4 weeks answer? 
41  One way to determine the truthfulness of DUF reports about guns is to consider the accuracy 
of self-reports for drug use, since DUF and  its successor ADAM collect biological specimens 
(urine) which are then tested for indicators of drug use.  Marijuana use typically seems to be 
reasonably well reported, cocaine and opiate use less so.  One problem with urine tests is that 
opiates and cocaine are rapidly excreted from the body and so use only within the past 24-36 
hours can be detected in urine, compared to use within the past 2-3 weeks for marijuana (Richter 
and  Johnson,  2001).    Hair  analysis  does  a  better  job  of  detecting  use  over  the  past  month, 
particularly for opiates and cocaine, but is less reliable for capturing very recent use given that 
hair takes time to grow out.  In any case the ratio of self-reported use to positive drug assays 
(urine tests) in the national DUF for 1987-91 equal 1.1 for marijuana use past 48 hours, 1.3 for 
opiate use past 48 hours, and 0.51 for cocaine past 48 hours; for use past 30 days self reports 
and hair analysis correspond closely for pot but less well for cocaine and opiates (Mieczkowski, 
2002, p. 108).   
42 This type of reward program has been employed in New York but has to date not been 
rigorously evaluated (Golden and Almo, 2004).   23 
effects.  Of course this virtuous cycle becomes vicious if reversed, which is of 
some concern given recent cuts in federal funding for law enforcement in general 
and for gun-oriented activities in particular (Donohue, 2004, Lichtblau, 2004). 
 
    In addition our results provide some support for police strategies that hold 
the gang as a whole accountable for gun possession or misuse by individual 
members, thus creating an incentive for gang leaders to regulate gun access 
among members. This collective-deterrence strategy seeks to leverage gang 
cohesion together with the economic motivations of gang leaders and was a key 
feature of Boston’s Operation Ceasefire (Braga et al., 2001, Piehl et al., 2003). 
 
    Finally, our study highlights the potential value in also targeting policies at 
goods that are complementary to gun ownership – namely, storage and 
ammunition. Youths tend to have limited storage options.  And increasing the 
costs of storage by may depress youth demand for guns.  The Chicago Public 
Schools have recently strengthened their efforts in this regard.
43  Guns and 
ammo are even stronger complements, which leads to considerable physical 
risks in transacting both goods simultaneously and causes the markets for these 
two goods to be largely distinct.  Additional efforts to separate gun and ammo 
markets and make the latter even more friction-laden may have limited effects on 
gun use in crime, since an unloaded gun may be adequate for securing 
compliance by victims, but could help reduce the number of deaths each year 







                                                 
43 While many public school systems in urban areas employ metal detectors in high schools, 
since the 2003-04 academic year the Chicago Public Schools has also employed X-ray machines 
at a growing number of high schools and even a few middle schools as well.  In addition over the 
past few years the CPS has increased the amount of training for school security guards,.All CPS 
employees, including security guards, must submit to a fingerprinting background check before 
being hired.  Increasingly CPS makes use of random "surprise screening" programs in schools 
that are not able to conduct their own regular metal screening at school entrances. 
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Data Appendix 
 
  Our analysis of  Chicago’s underground gun market draws on data from 6 
main sources:  intensive field interviews and observations conducted in high-
crime neighborhoods on the city’s South Side by one member of our team 
(Sudhir Venkatesh); data on crime gun traces from Chicago collected by the 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF); a census of all arrests made in 
the state of Illinois from 1990 to 2001 recorded by the Illinois State Police (ISP); 
city- and state-level data on crime rates and gun ownership from the FBI’s 
Uniform Crime Report (UCR) system; the census of all death certificates in the 
U.S. maintained as part of the Vital Statistics (VS) system; and data from the 
Drug Use Forecasting (DUF) system of arrestee interviews, specifically data from 
the 1996-7 gun addendum to DUF.  In what follows we discuss each of these 
sources in turn. 
 
A. Field Interviews 
 
    Starting in 2001 fieldwork was conducted by one member of our team 
(Sudhir Venkatesh) over a period of 15 months in a poor urban region of Chicago 
known as Greater Grand Boulevard.  This community is a large contiguous 
swatch of poor and working-class neighborhoods in the Southside of Chicago.  
The area is comprised almost entirely of African-Americans; it forms the heart of 
the “Black Metropolis,” Chicago’s most historic African-American settlement. 
Three distinct “community areas”—the historic administrative unit that sub-
divides (in a mutually exclusive manner) the City of Chicago—comprise Greater 
Grand Boulevard. At the northern end is Grand Boulevard, which has become a 
space of considerable gentrification and economic development, thereby 
combining extremely poor city blocks with blocks of middle-class homeowners. At 
the eastern end is Oakland, an institutionally eviscerated space and one that is 
extremely poor. At the southern end is Washington Park, a concentrated poverty 
neighborhood that is noteworthy for the presence of the Robert Taylor Homes 
public housing development and open expanses of under-used and abandoned 
land tracts that host numerous forms of underground economic activity (of which 
gun sales are one).  
 
    In 2003 these three Chicago community areas – Oakland, Grand 
Boulevard and Washington Park – experienced a total of 17 homicides.  Given 
48,262 people, this figure implies a homicide rate per 100,000 people of about 35 
(Chicago PD Annual Report, 2003), around 6 times the national average. 
 
    It is worth noting several community-wide attributes of Greater Grand 
Boulevard that impact this study of gun markets.  First, the street gangs in 
Greater Grand Boulevard have historically been the most powerful African-
American gangs in the city. In the last three decades, the local gangs have 
become increasingly entrepreneurial; their income derives primarily from 
narcotics and extortion, secondarily from guns and looting. In the late 1990s, an   30 
important shift occurred that is beginning to affect the organization of gun 
markets: federal law enforcement indictments, by dissolving gangs and loosening 
their ties to one another, are leading to changes in the supply and demand 
structure of guns—e.g., leading to rising gun sales among young people in 
gangs, shifts in the suppliers to the area, changing patterns of violence (in which 
guns are and are not present). 
 
  Second, the physical infrastructure of the area is changing dramatically 
because of public housing demolition and heightened gentrification—shifts that 
are accelerating population turnover and leading to re-zoning of industrial and 
residential lands. An area once known only for blight and physical deterioration is 
beginning to boast a real estate revival. The implications for gun trading are 
significant because the physical landscape can play an important role in shaping 
how guns are stored, sold, and used. Given these changes we focus only on gun 
markets outside of public housing, given that any in-depth findings on public 
housing-based gun use and trading would soon be outdated. 
 
  SV’s interview samples are defined by age and criminal orientation, as well as 
role in the underground gun market.  Sample size is a somewhat imprecise 
concept with ethnographic fieldwork, since for example some of these 
discussions might be held informally with a group of people in a public housing 
hallway.  We try to count “respondents” only as those with whom SV had a 
reasonably lengthy one-on-one discussion.  There is also some ambiguity about 
people’s roles within the neighborhood; for example SV’s definitions of “gang 
affiliated” may not correspond to those used by the Chicago Police Department. 
 
  With these caveats in mind, interviews were conducted with around 190 non-
gang affiliated youth (under 22 years of age), of whom 116 owned a gun, and 
around 75 gang-affiliated youth, whose gun ownership status is difficult to 
determine from these interviews directly since gangs strictly regulate access to 
guns for youth.  Note that human subjects requirements prevented us from 
interviewing minors, so youth are 18 and older.  SV also interviewed around 90 
non-gang affiliated adults (22 or older), of whom around 45 owned a gun; and 
around 57 interviews with gang-affiliated adults (including 12 gang leaders), of 
whom 50 owned a gun..  In addition SV conducted interviews with 12 elite gun 
suppliers (importers or wholesalers), 11 retail brokers, 17 adults engaged actively 
with criminal associations, and 77 prostitutes. 
 
B. Crime Gun Traces 
 
  We also draw on data from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms 
(ATF) on crime guns confiscated by the Chicago Police Department between 
1999 and 2003 submitted to ATF for tracing.  By using serial numbers that are 
unique to a given gun (conditional on manufacturer), ATF tries to identify the first 
legal purchaser of the firearm by accessing the commercial transactions records 
maintained by law by dealers, distributors and manufacturers.   31 
 
  Between 1999 and 2003 the Chicago PD submitted all confiscated crime 
guns to the ATF for trace requests, as part of ATF’s Youth Crime Gun 
Intervention Initiative (YCGII).  A total of 43,413 guns were submitted for tracing 
over this period, of which 23,237 (53.5%) were successfully traced.  This tracing 
success rate is quite similar for our study area of GB / WP and for the rest of 
Chicago.  This tracing success rate is also quite similar to national data for 1999 
(54%).  Nationwide in 1999, 10% of guns could not be traced because the guns 
were too old, while others could not be traced because of problems with the 
serial number or errors in the paperwork and the like.  It is important to note that 
even when guns are successfully traced this process can only identify the first 
purchaser from a FFL, and provides no information on subsequent transactions 
in the underground distribution chain (see Cook and Braga, 2003 for more on the 
trace process and limitations of the ATF data). 
 
C. Arrest Data 
 
    Our third source of data consists of a census of all arrests made in the 
state of Illinois from 1990 to 2001 reported to the ISP.  These data provide 
information on the date of each arrest, the arresting agency (so that we can 
distinguish arrests in Chicago versus elsewhere in the state, but cannot 
determine where within Chicago a crime was committed), all criminal charges 
filed against the suspect as part of the arrest, and (albeit with some additional 
measurement error) the disposition of these charges. 
 
D. UCR Crime Data 
 
    To measure gun involvement in crime in Chicago and other cities we use 
standard data from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Report (UCR) system.  These data 
capture crimes voluntarily reported by victims to the police and then voluntarily 
submitted by police to the FBI.  Problems with the UCR data in terms of variation 
across areas and time in victim reporting to police and police reporting to the FBI 
are well known (see for example Maltz, 1999).  However the UCR data are 
generally believed to be more reliable for more-serious than for less-serious 
offenses. 
 
E. Vital Statistics 
 
  To measure gun ownership rates we use data from the Vital Statistics (VS) 
census of all deaths to construct a measure of the fraction of suicides within a 
jurisdiction that is committed with firearms (firearm suicides divided by suicides, 
or FSS).  While the VS is generally thought to capture most deaths that occur in 
the U.S., one source of measurement error comes from the fact that coroners or 
medical examiners report the cause of death on the death certificate, which may 
disagree with the results of subsequent police investigations and more generally 
can be subject to some ambiguity.  (For example, when the beat-era writer   32 
William S. Borroughs famously tried to shoot an apple off of his wife’s head but 
missed and killed her instead the medical examiner handling the case may 
plausibly have had some doubts about whether to classify this as an accident, 
homicide or, from the perspective of Borroughs’ wife, suicide at least in a 
probabilistic sense).  The fraction of suicides that involve a firearm has been 
shown to be strongly correlated with survey-based measures of household gun 
ownership rates in the cross-section (Azrael, Cook and Miller, 2004) and within 
states or regions over time as well (Cook and Ludwig, 2005). 
 
F. Drug Use Forecasting data 
 
    The Drug Use Forecasting (DUF) system is administered by the U.S. 
Department of Justice and has collected survey information on arrestees from 
1987 through 1997.  (The successor to the DUF is called the ADAM, which was 
itself recently discontinued).  Usually the sample includes arrestees from 24 
different U.S. cities, although sites vary somewhat from year to year.  Within 
participating cities, first a set of selected booking facilities are selected and then 
arrestees within these booking facilities are asked to be interviewed.  In Chicago 
and 10 other DUF sites (Atlanta, Cleveland, Denver, Detroit, Houston, Kansas 
City, Omaha, Philadelphia, St. Louis and Washington, DC) the catchment area 
for selecting booking facilities was the city.  In the other DUF sites (Dallas, Ft. 
Lauderdale, Indianapolis, Miami, New Orleans, Manhattan, Phoenix, Portland, 
San Antonio, and San Jose) booking facilities were selected from catchment 
areas defined by borough, county, or parish.  Each site attempts to collect data 
from around 225 adult males per quarter and 100 adult females.  Some (but not 
all) sites also attempt to collect data from 100 juvenile males and 100 juvenile 
females. 
 
    Typically around 90 percent of arrestees asked to participate agree to 
answer survey questions about drug use and involvement with crime, while 80 
percent agree to provide urine samples for drug testing.  These sources of data 
are complemented by administrative data from police arrest records regarding 
the arrestee’s demographics (age, race) and the crime for which the person was 
arrested. 
 
    In 1995, 1996 and 1997 the DUF survey included a gun addendum that 
asked survey respondents to report on their experiences with guns, including 
ownership, gun use in the most recent crime, acquisitions, victimization 
experiences and general availability in the community.  Because these data were 
collected for only the second half of 1995 we focus our analysis on data from 
1996 and 1997.  The DUF data used in our analyses are restricted-use and 
obtained under a special agreement with ICPSR.  For more information about the 
dataset see the documentation for ICPSR study number 9477.   33 
Table 1:  
Type and Caliber of Guns Confiscated in Chicago 
 
        Grand Blvd. / Wash Park   Rest of Chicago 
            (%)           (%) 
 
Number          4,483       38,930 
     
Type of firearm 
 
Semiautomatic Pistol         49.0         50.2 
Revolver           34.6         33.0 
Shotgun             7.7           7.9 
 
Rifle             7.2           7.0 
Derringer             1.5           1.6 
Other             0.1           0.2 
 
Total         100.0       100.0 
 
Caliber / Gauge   
 
9mm           18.7         18.0 
.38           15.9         15.5 
.22           11.4         12.9 
.380           10.4         11.2 
 
.32             7.5           6.7 
.25             7.2           8.4 
.357             6.9           6.5 
.45             5.5           4.7 
   
12 gauge             5.4           5.7 
.40             2.5           2.1 
Other             8.7           8.3 
 
Total         100.0       100.0 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations of guns submitted by Chicago Police Department 




Source States of Guns Confiscated in Chicago 
 
        Grand Blvd. / Wash Park  Rest of Chicago 
 
            (%)               (%)   
State 
Illinois           46.2             48.3 
Indiana           11.5             11.6 
Mississippi           10.9               9.6 
Wisconsin             3.4               2.8 
 
Georgia             2.4               1.8 
Arkansas             2.3               1.8 
Kentucky             2.3               2.5 
Alabama             2.0               1.8 
 
Texas             1.9               2.0 
Tennessee             1.7               2.2 
Other           15.4             15.6 
 
Total         100.0           100.0 
 
 
Source:  See Table 1 
 
      Grand Blvd. / Wash Park               Rest of Chicago 
 
            (%)             (%)
   
State 
Illinois           46.2             48.3 
Indiana           11.5             11.6 
Mississippi           10.9               9.6 
Wisconsin             3.4               2.8 
 
Georgia             2.4               1.8 
Arkansas             2.3               1.8 
Kentucky             2.3               2.5 
Alabama             2.0               1.8 
 
Texas             1.9               2.0 
Tennessee             1.7               2.2 
Other           15.4             15.6 
 
Total         100.0           100.0 
 
 
Source:  See Table 1 




Retail Price and Age of Guns Confiscated in Chicago 
 
  Grand Blvd/ Wash Park  Rest of Chicago 





















































































































































































Source: See Table 1.   “Retail price” is estimated price of gun sold new at retail 
from Blue Book figures, and does not account for actual condition of gun, which 
is not available in the ATF data.   36 
Table 4:   
Type of Crimes Leading to Gun Confiscation in Chicago, by age of 
Possessor 
 
        Grand Boulevard / Wash Park          Other Neighborhoods 
Recovery crime     Juvenile      Youth      Adult   Juvenile      Youth      Adult 
                           (<18)     (18-24)      (25+)    (<18)     (18-24)     (25+) 
                              %          %             %    %              %          % 
 
Firearms offense   50.0         39.4        37.0       57.8       51.1        51.0 
 
Narcotics crime   43.6          50.6         49.6  24.8       33.8        33.1 
 
Violent crime            5.1           8.3         11.1  13.7       11.6        10.8 
 
Other crime      1.3            1.7           2.3    3.6         3.6          5.0 
 
Total            100.0       100.0       100.0      100.0     100.0      100.0 
 
(Number)     (78)         (348)       (395)  (548)    (2432)     (3252) 
 
 
Source:  See Table 1   
Violent crime = homicide, robbery, assaults, kidnapping, sex crimes (i.e. rape / 
assault);  
Narcotics crime = drug offenses not distinguished by possession, sales, or type 
of drug;  
Other crime = burglary, theft, fraud, explosives, vice crimes, integrity crimes, etc.;  
Firearms offense = illegal carrying or possession of a firearm (carrying and 
possession are not distinguished in the data).  37 
Table 5 
 
Gun Acquisition and Gang Membership in Chicago Arrested  
 
  Full sample  Adult males only 
Sample size (N)  1,194  1,074 
Ever own handgun? 





Gun acquisitions (for those ever 
owned gun) 
Stole 
Rented / borrowed 
Bought 




Amount paid if bought: 
$    0-50 
$  50-99 
$100-199 
$200-499 














































How long to get gun? ( those who 
want one)  
  More than a week 









  Current 








Source:  Author calculations from Drug Use Forecasting System data for 1996 
and 1997 (ICPSR 9477).   38 
Table 6 
 
Markers for Straw Purchases for Guns Confiscated in Chicago 
 




Confiscated within 3 






Confiscated within 3 
years of initial purchase 






Confiscated within 3 
years of initial purchase 
and first purchased in 






Source:  See Table 1   39 
 
Table 7:  
 
Gang Membership among Adult Male Arrestees 
 
City  Current gang 
member 
Current or past gang 
member 
Sample Size 
Chicago  19.8  43.6  1,074 
Los Angeles  12.2  27.5  1,181 
Indianapolis  5.5  22.0  1,811 
St. Louis  5.5  25.2  1,039 
Birmingham  5.1  14.6  1,738 
Denver  3.7  17.8  1,830 
Omaha  3.5  16.5  1,756 
Houston  3.2  16.1  1,325 
San Antonio  3.0  14.6  1,110 
Dallas  2.7  13.2  1,892 
San Jose  2.4  12.1  708 
Miami  2.2  10.5  1,059 
Cleveland  1.5  15.6  1,130 
Philadelphia  1.4  15.1  1,083 
New York  1.2  13.9  1,471 
New Orleans  0.9  7.0  1,931 
Portland  0.9  10.9  211 
Detroit  0.8  9.9  1,408 
Atlanta  0.7  8.1  1,525 
Washington  0.4  5.2  1,377 
Median  2.6  12.7  29,149 
 
Source: DUF samples of adult male arrestees, 1996 and 1997. (See appendix for 
details.)   40 
Figure 1 
 
Trends in % Suicides with Guns (Proxy for Gun Ownership)  
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Figure 2 
 
Trends in % Suicides with Guns, 
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